strict liability cases

Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132.

The defendant was a landlady of a house let to tenants. She retained one room in the house for herself and visited occasionally to collect the rent and letters. While she was absent the police searched the house and found cannabis. The defendant was convicted under s5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 (now replaced), of "being concerned in the management of premises used for the smoking of cannabis". She appealed alleging that she had no knowledge of the circumstances and indeed could not expect reasonably to have had such knowledge.

The House of Lords, quashing her conviction, held that it had to be proved that the defendant had intended the house to be used for drug-taking, since the statute in question created a serious, or "truly criminal" offence, conviction for which would have grave consequences for the defendant. Lord Reid stated that "a stigma still attaches to any person convicted of a truly criminal offence, and the more serious or more disgraceful the offence the greater the stigma". And equally important, "the press in this country are vigilant to expose injustice, and every manifestly unjust conviction made known to the public tends to injure the body politic [people of a nation] by undermining public confidence in the justice of the law and of its administration."

Lord Reid went on to point out that in any event it was impractical to impose absolute liability for an offence of this nature, as those who were responsible for letting properties could not possibly be expected to know everything that their tenants were doing.

Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918.
The defendant was convicted of selling alcohol to a police officer whilst on duty, contrary to s16(2) of the Licensing Act 1872. He had reasonably believed the constable to be off duty as he had removed his arm-band, which was the acknowledged method of signifying off duty. The Divisional Court held that the conviction should be quashed, despite the absence from s16(2) of any words requiring proof of mens rea as an element of the offence. Wright J expressed the view that the presumption in favour of mens rea would only be displaced by the wording of the statute itself, or its subject matter. In this case the latter factor was significant, in that no amount of reasonable care by the defendant would have prevented the offence from being committed. Wright J stated:

"It is plain that if guilty knowledge is not necessary, no care on the part of the publican could save him from a conviction under section 16, subsection (2), since it would be as easy for the constable to deny that he was on duty when asked, or to produce a forged permission from his superior officer, as to remove his armlet before entering the public house. I am, therefore, of opinion that this conviction ought to be quashed."

Lim Chin Aik v R [1963] AC 160.
The defendant had been convicted of contravening an order prohibiting in absolute terms, his entry into Singapore, despite his ignorance of the order's existence. In allowing the defendant's appeal, Lord Evershed expressed the view that the imposition of strict liability could only really be justified where it would actually succeed in placing the onus to comply with the law on the defendant. If the defendant is unaware that he has been made the subject of an order prohibiting him from entering a country, the imposition of strict liability should he transgress the order would not in anyway promote its observance. Lord Evershed stated:

"But it is not enough in their Lordship's opinion merely to label the statute as one dealing with a grave social evil and from that to infer that strict liability was intended. It is pertinent also to inquire whether putting the defendant under strict liability will assist in the enforcement of the regulations. That means that there must be something he can do, directly or indirectly, by supervision or inspection, by improvement of his business methods or by exhorting those whom he may be expected to influence or control, which will promote the observance of the regulations. Unless this is so, there is no reason in penalising him, and it cannot be inferred that the legislature imposed strict liability merely in order to find a luckless victim."

 Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824.
The defendants were charged with causing polluted matter to enter a river contrary to s2 of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951. The river had in fact been polluted because a pipe connected to the defendant's factory had been blocked, and the defendants had not been negligent. The House of Lords nevertheless held that the defendants were liable. Lord Salmon stated:

If this appeal succeeded and it were held to be the law that no conviction be obtained under the 1951 Act unless the prosecution could discharge the often impossible onus of proving that the pollution was caused intentionally or negligently, a great deal of pollution would go unpunished and undeterred to the relief of many riparian factory owners. As a result, many rivers which are now filthy would become filthier still and many rivers which are now clean would lose their cleanliness. The legislature no doubt recognised that as a matter of public policy this would be most unfortunate. Hence s2(1)(a) which encourages riparian factory owners not only to take reasonable steps to prevent pollution but to do everything possible to ensure that they do not cause it.